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Abstract. This article describes some of the philosophical Issues that permeate the belief systems of 
individuals attempting to craft and/or evaluate the verification components of various weapons-related 
treaties. 
 
Verification often proves to be a significant stumbling block in developing, evaluating, signing, and 
seeking to ratify weapons limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation treaties. One part of the stumbling 
block comprises the varied philosophical assumptions--conscious and unconscious--permeating the 
belief systems of policymakers, negotiators, and legislators involved in these processes. 
 
Many verifiers speak and act as if they are logical positivists--even if they've never heard the term 
before. They believe that verification must be built on observation. 
 
The radical logical positivists seem to believe that there must be data "out there" in the real, material 
world that serve as "smoking guns" and can lead to total confirmation or disconfirmation of a party's 
compliance with a treaty. They also seem to believe that there procedures that must be rigorously 
followed that will lead to discovering the "smoking gun" data. 
 
The more moderate logical positivists--while adhering to belief in reality as the material world, the 
import of observation, and the necessity of rigorous procedures--allow that confirmation or 
disconfirmation may not be total. Instead, the latter may be partial but approaching totality through 
accumulation of data. 
 
Unfortunately, significant problems occur with the logical positivist approach to verification. (1) Much of 
what we observe is dependent on our sensory modalities. Yet through technological advances, we have 
discovered that there is more to the world than what we can sense. And even with ever-newer 
technological advances, realms of the world more obviously seem to exist beyond the observable. And, 
of course, as we depend on technology to broaden our knowledge of the world, we lose our direct 
experience of this world. By demanding observable criteria, the weapons-treaty developer or evaluator 
is not being hard-nosed, but soft-headed. Realms of the world are being discounted as irrelevant and 
meaningless to the detriment of security. The limitations of observation are further illustrated by well-
documented illusions--the products of normative human perception--and by the vagaries of observation 
depending on need state--hunger, need to believe in an enemy, and so on. (2) Building on this last point, 
we might note that the logical positivists discount most if not all of mental phenomena, because the 
latter cannot be satisfactorily observed but only inferred. But histories seem to suggest--from the Chan-
kuo Ts'e through The Peloponnesian War to modern journalistic accounts of ethnocentric conflicts--that 
intentions, fears, beliefs and other mental constructs are heavily involved in security matters. In fact, 
what about the logical positivists' beliefs concerning observation, the material world, and rigorous 
procedures? What do we make of these beliefs in light of the positivists' critique of beliefs? What do the 
positivists make of their beliefs in light of the belief critique? (3) We also must note that logical 
positivists and other humans do not live their lives as if logical positivism was the case. Our behaviors 
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are partially based on hopes, desires, inferences, intuitions, feelings, morals and ethics (that one would 
be very uncomfortably stretched to confirm through observation and procedure), and nomological 
networks of constructs having less and less association with direct experience. And even if each of these 
could correspond with observable data--e.g., anger with the clenching of teeth--then what of the 
dissimulator? Because we cannot directly observe most of history, does that mean most of history does 
not exist? Or if history is defined by procedures of discovery, does a historical statement that the Hittites 
conquered the Egyptians denote the past? Or does it denote only a future of what will happen if we 
follow certain procedures of history and consult books and artifacts and the like? 
 
In the world of treaty development and evaluation, the verifiers act and always have acted--regardless 
of their claims--as what we now call postmodernists. They develop, share, conflict over, and deconstruct 
narratives of reality. Their notions of deterrence, correlation of forces, offensive and defensive 
capabilities, and destabilization are no different than notions of love and hate. (See Algarabel, S., & Dasi, 
C. (1996.) Heuristics and memory strategies used by mathematicians. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 83, 
41-42; Liu Hsiang. (c. 20/1996). In J. I. Crump (Trans.), Chan-kuo Ts'e. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese 
Studies; Sargent, R-M. (1997). The social construction of scientific evidence. Journal of Constructivist 
Psychology, 10, 75-96; Shareef, R. (1997). A Popperian view of change in innovative organizations. 
Human Relations, 50, 655-670; Thucydides. (c. 405 B.C./1967) In R. Warner (Trans.), The Peloponnesian 
War. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.) (Keywords: Information Warfare, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, 
Perception Management, Verification.) 
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